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NOTES 
Motions for Appointment of Counsel and the Collateral Order 
Doctrine 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, 1 it seemed clear that orders denying appointment of 
counsel in title VIP and in forma pauperis3 cases were immediately 
appealable as a matter of right.4 The courts of appeals that had con-
sidered these issues had held the orders immediately appealable under 
the finality rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 12915 and refined by the judi-
cially created collateral order doctrine. 6 The consensus of the cir-
cuits and the absence of any substantial analysis of the issue7 may have 
1. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). 
2. Title VII provides for appointment of counsel in employment discrimination cases: 
"Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the 
court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of 
the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). 
3. Federal law permits the commencement of actions in forma pauperis, which in certain 
cases relieves an indigent claimant from having to pay costs and fees and allows the appointment 
of public counsel: ''The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to 
employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that 
the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). 
4. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Ray v. 
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 476-77 (3d Cir. 1981). But see Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 
(3d Cir. 1984) (finding that the circuit's earlier holding in Ray had been "effectively overruled" 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984)). 
According to Bradshaw, all courts of appeals addressing the appealability of orders denying 
appointment of counsel in title VII cases before Firestone had "held such orders appealable, 
finding them to fall squarely within the Cohen 'collateral order' exception to the final judgment 
rule." 662 F.2d at 1305 (footnote omitted); see also Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576, 578 
(7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overturned, Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 
(7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 
1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 
1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977); Spanos v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(per curiam). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit, in Harris v. Walgreen's Distrib. Center, 456 F.2d 588 
(6th Cir. 1972), "implicitly reached a similar result with respect to orders denying appointment 
of counsel in Title VII suits, without discussing the issue." Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1305-06 n.11. 
The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion regarding a motion for appointment of counsel 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962). According to Bradshaw, "[t]he Miller reasoning is equally 
applicable to Title VII orders." 662 F.2d at 1305 n.11. 
5. "The courts of appeals • • . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States . • . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (emphasis added). There are, however, several statutory and 
judicial exceptions to the finality rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982); note 38 infra. 
6. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). ' 
7. The courts generally took the appeal after only a minimal analysis of the appealability 
issue. The resulting per curiam opinions often did little more than cite Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 
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fostered a belief that the courts had settled the question of appealabil-
ity of orders denying appointment of counsel. 8 
In Firestone, the Supreme Court held that a pretrial order denying 
a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is not appealable before final 
judgment.9 As a result, the appeals courts began to reconsider their 
positions on the appealability of orders denying appointment of coun-
sel. The Ninth and Third Circuits reaffirmed their original positions 
upholding immediate appeal. 10 The Seventh Circuit overturned an 
earlier decision 11 and held that orders denying motions to appoint 
counsel are not immediately appealable. 12 The First and Tenth Cir-
cuits, facing the issue for the first time, also refused to hear an immedi-
ate appeal. 13 Again, with one exception, the courts reached their 
results in a conclusory fashion. 14 
Two recent cases have answered questions concerning the appeala-
bility of orders granting motions to disqualify counsel that the Court 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per 
curiam), overturned, Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Spanos v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 964 
(1962). 
8. In Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overturned, Randle 
v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), the last decision on 
the issue before Firestone, the court dealt with the appealability question in a conclusory foot-
note. 626 F.2d at n.* ("An order denying appointment of counsel is appealable under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.") (citation omitted). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of an appeal from 
the denial of a request for appointed counsel without even mentioning the propriety of such an 
appeal. Harris v. Walgreen's Distrib. Center, 456 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1972). As the Ninth Circuit 
noted in Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), "[l]ew of the cases 
deciding the question of appealability of a refusal to appoint counsel have considered the issue 
sufficiently difficult to merit prolonged discussion; most take their lead from the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion in Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977)." (footnote omitted). 
Caston itself contains little analysis to support the result it reaches. See note 24 infra. 
9. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). 
10. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 
474 (3d Cir. 1981). In a later decision, the Third Circuit stated that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984), "effectively overruled" Ray. Smith-
Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984). 
11. Jones v. WFYR Radio, 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), overturned, Randle v. 
Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
12. Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
13. Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 
F.2d 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
14. The exception is Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981). Dissent-
ing in Bradshaw, Judge Wallace stated: "The opinions cited by the majority ••• contain so little 
analysis that they can hardly be considered persuasive. Some rely exclusively on Caston • • . 
which •.• contains only one paragraph of analysis." 662 F.2d at 1320 n. l. (Wallace, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Wallace conceded, however, that "the majority more than makes up for this paucity 
of reasoning." 662 F.2d at 1320 n.l. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit devoted over fifteen pages to 
arguments supporting its conclusion that orders denying appointment of counsel are immediately 
appealable. 662 F.2d at 1303-18. 
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had left open in Firestone. 15 In Flanagan v. United States, 16 the Court 
ruled that such an order, in a criminal case, was not a final order im-
mediately appealable under the collateral order exception. Since 
Flanagan was decided, the courts of appeals have again split on the 
question of whether orders denying appointment of counsel are imme-
diately appealable. The Third Circuit found that Flanagan effectively 
overturned its post-Firestone decision that such orders are immedi-
ately appealable. 17 The Sixth Circuit originally distinguished Flana-
gan and held that orders refusing appointment of counsel could be 
immediately appealed; however, it recently vacated that decision in 
accord with Flanagan. 18 The Eighth Circuit reached the same result 
that the Sixth originally did, but did not discuss Flanagan. 19 
In the 1985 case of Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller 20 the Court 
expanded the holding of Flanagan to include orders disqualifying 
counsel in civil cases.21 It is not clear whether Koller will have an 
impact upon the circuit courts' analysis of cases involving trial court 
orders denying appointment of counsel. 
This Note argues that denials of motions for appointment of coun-
sel should be immediately appealable under the collateral order excep-
tion to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.22 Part I examines the extent to which the 
15. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), "[t]he Court reserved 
the questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial denials of disqualification motions in 
criminal cases and of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases." 
Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1052 (1984); see Firestone, 449 U.S. at 372 n.8. 
Flanagan settled this question in the context of criminal cases; Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. 
Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985) did the same in the civil area. 
16. 104 s. Ct. 1051 (1984). 
17. Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that Flanagan effectively over-
turned Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
18. Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 739 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 763 
F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985). 
19. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1984). 
20. 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985). 
21. Koller contains quite broad language. In expressly taking its holding outside the particu-
lar facts of the case, the Court stated that "orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases, as a class, 
are not sufficiently separable from the merits to qualify for interlocutory appeal." 105 S. Ct. at 
2766. Orders disqualifying counsel are distinguishable from the orders discussed in this Note 
(trial court orders refusing to appoint counsel). See notes 116-32 infra and accompanying text. 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Although there are other means of appealing before final judg-
ment, see notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text, this Note focuses on the collateral order 
doctrine because it provides the best and perhaps the only means of obtaining immediate review 
of an order denying appointment of counsel. Clearly, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) do not apply to this type of order. See note 38 infra. Further, 
mandamus is a disfavored form of review, while the rule of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 
201 (1848) is very rarely invoked. See note 30 infra. If the collateral order doctrine applies, on 
the other hand, review is available as a matter of right. See notes 38-39 infra. Moreover, certifi-
cation under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982) is discretionary with the district court. It is not clear 
that this type of order meets the requirements for immediate review set out in§ 1292(b). Section 
1292(b) is chiefly concerned with judicial efficiency, whereas review of orders denying appoint-
ment of counsel is necessary because of the risk of irreparable harm to the pro se litigant. While 
irreparable harm is central to the collateral order analysis, it appears to be irrelevant to certifica-
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collateral order doctrine modifies the finality rule. It argues that re-
cent Supreme Court decisions that at first appear to have narrowed the 
doctrine have in fact only restated it. Part II applies the collateral 
order doctrine to orders denying appointment of counsel, concluding 
that such denials qualify for immediate review. Part III argues that 
policy considerations support this conclusion. 
I. THE FINALITY RULE AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER 
DOCTRINE: COHEN TO KOLLER 
In the federal courts, only a final judgment is appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.23 The Supreme Court has defined a final judgment as 
"one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment."24 Moreover, section 1291 for-
bids appeals "even from fully consummated decisions, where they are 
but steps towards final judgments in which they will merge."25 The 
final judgment rule implements the policy against permitting "piece-
meal appeals"26 that might undermine the authority of district court 
judges.27 
Nevertheless, the courts and Congress have for some time recog-
nized that strict and technical insistence on finality would be, at times, 
both inefficient and unjust. 28 Congress has acknowledged this point by 
tion under§ 1292(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). The courts that have considered the ap-
pealability of orders denying appointment of counsel have focused exclusively on the collateral 
order doctrine. 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962) ("[T]he 
final judgment rule is the dominant rule in federal appellate practice.") (quoting 6 J. MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 113 (2d ed. 1953)); note 5 supra. 
24. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citing St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. Co. v. 
Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883)). This language is repeated in Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463,467 (1978). Stated another way, the effect of the finality rule "is to disallow appeal from any 
decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Cohen Court added that "[a]ppeal gives the upper court a power of 
review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, 
there may be no intrusion by appeal." 337 U.S. at 546. 
25. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
26. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); see also Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (The final judgment rule "prevents .•• piecemeal 
appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy."); Cobbledick 
v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) ("[B]y forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of 
what for practical purposes is a single controversy, [Congress] set itself against enfeebling judicial 
administration."). 
27. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Permitting piecemeal 
appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that 
individual plays in our judicial system."). 
28. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981), ("[A) rigid 
insistence on technical finality would sometimes conflict with the purposes of the statute.") 
(quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978)); see also Note, The Finality 
Rule for Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1008 (1978) 
(Rigid adherence to the finality rule may lead to "inefficient results."); Note, Proposals for Inter-
locutory Appeals, 58 YALE L.J. 1186, 1187 (1949) ("In many instances, however, the final judg-
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creating statutory exceptions to finality;29 the courts have developed 
the collateral order doctrine.30 That doctrine, embodied in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 31 and its progeny, reflects a concern 
on the part of the courts that the finality requirement be pragmatically 
construed so as to avoid potentially irreparable injuries to the 
litigant. 32 
An individual seeking immediate appeal of an order declining to 
appoint counsel must invoke the collateral order doctrine. Neither 
mandamus nor interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)33 are 
helpful alternatives. Mandamus has long been considered an ex-
traordinary avenue to appellate review; this perception, in part, has led 
to the adoption of alternative means of review like section 1292(b ). 34 
Section 1292(b) is also an inadequate alternative since it allows inter-
locutory appeals to be certified only on controversial questions of law 
ment rule may be a wasteful formality; and under certain circumstances it can gravely jeopardize 
the rights of litigants.") (footnote omitted). 
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982) provides for immediate review of orders dealing with injunc-
tions, appointment of receivers, and admiralty cases. Section 1292(b) provides for interlocutory 
appeals if (1) the trial judge certifies that an order "involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . . 
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation" and (2) if the appellate court 
decides to accept such an appeal. FED. R. C1v. P. 54(b) provides for interlocutory appeal under 
certain circumstances in multiple party or multiple claim litigation. Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
(1982) provides for writs of mandamus, which may substitute for interlocutory appeal in extreme 
situations. 
30. The collateral order doctrine is by far the most common judicial exception to finality. 
Several circuits formerly allowed another exception in cases where the order would effectively 
terminate the case by making it impossible for the plaintiff to continue. This approach, which 
came to be known as the "death knell" doctrine, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Coopers 
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
Co0PER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3912 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 15 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE]. In addition, the so-called Forgay doctrine provides a very limited exception to final-
ity where hardship may result from orders that cannot be reviewed before final judgment are 
entered before complete disposition of a case. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE supra, at 
§ 3910. This doctrine originated in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). 
31. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Cohen was a shareholder's derivative suit in which the trial court 
declined to require the plaintiff to post security for costs despite a state law that so required. The 
defendant appealed the ruling before final judgment and the appellate court reversed. The 
Supreme Court took this occasion to announce the collateral order doctrine and upheld the de-
fendant's right to immediate appeal. While the collateral order doctrine is often thought to have 
originated in Cohen, the Supreme Court has noted that Cohen only reformulated an older rule. 
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981) ("Cohen did not establish 
new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a 'practical rather than technical con-
struction.' ") (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546); see also Note, Appellate Procedure: Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord: Tightening the Collateral Order Doctrine, 50 UMKC L. REv. 99, 
102 n.28 (1981) (agreeing that "only the formulation" of the doctrine was new). 
32. According to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976), the collateral order 
doctrine reflects "the core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if possi-
ble, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable 
injuries to be suffered." See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 
(1981). 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). See note 29 supra. 
34. See Note, Appea/ability in the Federal Courts, 15 HARV. L. REv. 351, 378 (1961). 
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on which a substantial basis for a difference of opinion exists and from 
which an appeal might expedite the litigation. 35 
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine as Articulated in Cohen 
The collateral order doctrine formulated by Cohen v. Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corp. 36 permits an appeals court to treat "a 'small class' 
of orders that d[o] not end the main litigation [as] final and appealable 
pursuant to § 1291."37 It has repeatedly been described as a narrow 
exception to the finality requirement for appellate review set forth in 
28 u.s.c. § 1291.38 
The Supreme Court in Cohen set forth a test to determine which 
orders fall within the small class that can be treated as final. Pursuant 
to the Cohen standard, an order is immediately appealable if it "finally 
determine[s] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too in-
dependent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be 
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."39 
Since Cohen, the Supreme Court's determinations of finality under 
this test have not always been consistent.40 The Court itself has recog-
nized that "[n]o verbal formula yet devised can explain prior finality 
decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable guide 
for the future."41 This is partly because finality frequently involves 
35. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 499 (footnote omitted): 
Again, however, [§ 1292(b)] does not provide strong reason for generally restricting the 
collateral order doctrine. Its application depends on a certificate of the district court that an 
order involves a controlling question of law . . . . The questions of law posed by truly 
collateral orders are not apt either to be 'controlling' in relation to the rest of the litigation, 
nor to be important to advancing ultimate termination. 
See generally Comment, The Appealabi/ity of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of 
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 470-71 (1978). 
36. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
37. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
38. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Our decisions 
have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under§ 1291 
await final judgment on the merits."); Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th 
Cir. 1981) ("We recognize that the Cohen doctrine is to be regarded as an exception to the final 
judgment rule .... "); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("A 
narrow exception to the final judgment rule is the 'collateral order' doctrine of Cohen ••• ,"). 
39. 337 U.S. at 546. 
40. Compare Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964) ("We cannot 
say that the Court of Appeals chose wrongly [in allowing an immediate appeal] under the cir-
cumstances. And it seems clear now that the case is before us that the eventual costs • • . will 
certainly be less ifwe now pass on the questions presented ...• "), ll'ith Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) ("To be appcalable as a final collateral order, the 
challenged order must constitute 'a complete, formal and, in the trial court, final rejection' • • • 
of a claimed right 'where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review what-
soever.'" (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) and United States v. Ryan, 
402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)). 
41. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (footnote omitted). 
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close factual questions.42 Nevertheless, the Court has consistently ar-
ticulated the Cohen test in evaluating requests for immediate review.43 
B. Collateral Order Cases Since Cohen and Their Effect on the 
Original Rule 
Four recent decisions regarding the collateral order doctrine -
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 44 Firestone, 45 Flanagan, 46 and Koller 47 
- suggest that the Supreme Court has begun to retreat from the no-
tion that finality should be given a "practical rather than a technical 
construction."48 In all four cases, the Supreme Court reversed lower 
court decisions allowing immediate appeal. 49 
42. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 n.9 (1974), the Court noted: 
As Mr. Justice Black commented in Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964), 
"Whether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question 
that decision of that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments, and 
.•. it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what 
might well be called the 'twilight zone' of finality." 
See also Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TExAs L. REv. 292, 295-96 (1966). 
43. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Gillespie v. United 
States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951). Since 1949, the 
Supreme Court has allowed immediate appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss based on 
the double jeopardy clause, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); to proceed in forma 
pauperis, Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam); to reduce bail, 
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); and from an order granting a motion to allocate to the defen-
dant the costs of notice in a class action, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
Conversely, the Supreme Court, pursuant to this test, has refused to allow immediate appeals 
from orders refusing to certify class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Coopers & 
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 463; to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, United States v. Mac-
Donald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); to suppress evidence, DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962); 
to limit discovery, see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981); to quash 
a subpoena, United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); and to disqualify counsel, Firestone, 449 
U.S. at 368; Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 
105 s. Ct. 2757 (1985). 
44. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court refused to find an order 
denying class certification immediately appealable despite the lower court's conclusion that such 
an order made it impractical for plaintiff to continue the case. 
45. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). 
46. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). 
47. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985). 
48. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 375 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
546 (1949)). 
49. At the time Firestone was decided, six circuits refused to permit immediate appeal from 
orders refusing to disqualify opposing counsel while five permitted such appeals. Firestone, 449 
U.S. at 373 n.10 (1981). Before 1979, the circuits had been split eight-to-three in favor of al-
lowing appeal; but between 1979 and 1980, the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits overruled 
previous holdings that had allowed immediate appeal. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 373 n.10. 
Before Flanagan, seven circuits had allowed immediate appeals of orders disqualifying crimi-
nal defense counsel, while the Ninth Circuit had refused to do so. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 1053 
n.2. Similarly, at the time the Court decided Koller, two circuits refused to assert jurisdiction 
over immediate appeals of orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases, while four circuits did agree 
to hear such interlocutory appeals. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2762. 
When the Supreme Court decided Coopers & Lybrand, it reversed the Eighth Circuit's hold-
ing that denials of motion for class certification were immediately appealable. At the time of that 
decision, at least three circuits allowed appeals from orders denying class certification, while two 
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But while the Supreme Court may be attempting to control the 
loose application of the collateral order doctrine, so nothing in these 
four cases indicates that the Court has either changed its fundamental 
test for immediately appealable collateral orders or narrowed the basic 
principle set forth in Cohen. Indeed, despite its recent decisions deny-
ing the right to immediate appeal in certain contexts, the Supreme 
Court has continued to apply the collateral order doctrine in other 
situations.51 In fact, Coopers & Lybrand, Firestone, Flanagan, and 
Koller reinforce the Cohen collateral order doctrine rather than under-
cut it. 
In Coopers & Lybrand, although the Court reformulated the Cohen 
test slightly, it did not alter the substance of the test. The Coopers & 
Lybrand Court held that to be appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine, an "order must conclusively determine the disputed ques-
tion, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg-
ment."52 This three-prong standard53 requires, as does the Cohen test, 
a conclusive order collateral to the merits of the action itself. It differs 
denied such appeals. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 465 n.2. The Coopers & Lybrand holding 
also apparently overturned the death knell doctrine, which several circuits had used to allow 
immediate appeals. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 476 ("[T]he 'death knell' doctrine does not 
support appellate jurisdiction of prejudgment orders denying class certification.") 
50. See Note, Civil Procedure-Interlocutory Appeals: Orders Denying Disqualification of 
Counsel Are Not Appealable Pursuant to the Collateral Order Exception, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1035, 
1040 (1982) ("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has stressed that the collateral order doctrine is a 
yery narrow exception to the final judgment rule, the circuit courts have applied Cohen liberally 
to assert jurisdiction over a wide variety of interlocutory orders.") (footnote omitted); Note, 
supra note 31, at 107 (arguing that despite an apparent trend in the circuits to tighten the collat• 
era! order doctrine with respect to orders denying disqualification, the Supreme Court decided 
Firestone in an effort to accelerate the trend). 
51. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983) (up-
holding the finality of an order staying an action to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitra-
tion Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982)); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the 
finality of an order denying a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding finality of an administrative ruling despite respondent's 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) 
(upholding the finality of an order that granted class action status and imposed the costs of giving 
notice on the defendant). 
52. 437 U.S. at 468 (footnote omitted) (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 
(1977) and United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978)). 
53. There is some confusion as to whether the collateral order test has three parts or four. 
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper see four separate requirements: (1) a conclusive order, (2) 
collateral to the merits, (3) that is effectively unreviewable after final judgment, and (4) that 
affects a substantial right. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 470-71 (1976), 
However, it is not at all clear that the fourth part survives as an explicit additional requirement. 
One commentator has said, "Some courts have continued to require 'public importance,' even 
though the [Supreme] Court has not emphasized it in recent cases." Comment, supra note 35, at 
455-56 (footnotes omitted); see also Significant Development, The Collateral Order Doctrine After 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord: The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Ap-
pointment of Counsel, 62 B.U. L. REv. 845, 862-63 (1982) (interpreting "important issue" as a 
separate factor of the Cohen test but defining it as "the effect of the order on the particular 
litigant") (footnote omitted). In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1 (1983), however, the Supreme Court relied on the Coopers & Lybrand formulation of the 
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from the Cohen standard only in its specification that effective un-
reviewability on appeal from final judgment is a requirement for im-
mediate review. This specification really only clarifies the Cohen 
requirement that an order be "too important to be denied review."54 
In fact, in Cohen as well as in subsequent cases the Supreme Court has 
insisted upon a permanent loss of a substantial right as a prerequisite 
to interlocutory review.55 
Besides reformulating the Cohen test, the Court in Coopers & 
Lybrand also discarded the "death knell" doctrine as a basis for deter-
mining finality. This development does not, however, narrow the 
traditional Cohen rule. The death knell doctrine was developed by 
several courts of appeals as a means of permitting immediate review, 
independent of the Cohen exception, when an order would have the 
practical effect of terminating a case. 56 A rejection of the death knell 
collateral order doctrine. There, the Court viewed the doctrine as a three-part test and ignored 
the "important issue" language in Coopers & Lybrand. 460 U.S. at 11-12 & n.13. 
Actually it appears that Coopers & Lybrand may have quietly incorporated the fourth re-
quirement into the second - the requirement that the order "resolve an important issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468; see also 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 12 (finding the second requirement satisfied because "[a]n order that amounts 
to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important issue separate from the mer-
its") (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, the Court devoted little or no attention to the "substantial 
right" issue. 
Even if the "important issue" /"substantial right" requirement survives, it is quite clearly 
met in the case of an order denying appointment of counsel. The right to appointed counsel is 
frequently so substantial that it is, as a practical matter, dispositive of the action. See Part III 
infra. 
54. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see also Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 n.10 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658-59 
(1977) (characterizing Cohen's third prong as requiring that the decision involved "an important 
right which would be 'lost, probably irreparably,' if review had to await final judgment"). For an 
explanation of the requirement that the right involved be important, see note 53 supra. 
55. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see also Abney 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977). Cohen is a clear example of a case in which review 
must be interlocutory if an issue is to be reviewed at all. The movant sought to assert his right 
not to post bond. If the action had proceeded to final judgment without appeal, the issue would 
have become moot. The Court observed that "[w]hen that time comes, it will be too late effec-
tively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will 
have been lost, probably irreparably." 337 U.S. at 546; see also note 43 supra and cases cited 
therein. 
56. According to the death knell doctrine, an order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(1982) if it is likely to sound the death knell of the litigation. Pursuant to this doctrine, several 
courts used language indicating that orders denying class certification would be immediately 
reviewable. See, e.g., Hartman v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973) (suggesting that if the 
order had operated as the death knell of the action, it would have been appealable); IS FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3912. The Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983) described the death knell doctrine as follows: 
The "death knell" doctrine rested on the argument that in some situations an interlocutory 
decision (such as a refusal to certify a class) might terminate a suit as a practical matter 
because the named plaintiff would lack an economic incentive to pursue his individual claim. 
In a "death knell" case, however, the order sought to be appealed had no legal effect on the 
named plaintiff's ability to proceed with his individual claim in federal court. There is an 
obvious difference between a case in which the plaintiff himself may choose not to proceed, 
and a case in which the district court refuses to allow the plaintiff to litigate his claim in 
federal court. 
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concept preserves the collateral order doctrine as the primary judi-
cially created exception to finality. While Coopers & Lybrand may re-
flect a concern over the emergence of multiple judicial exceptions to 
finality, it does not suggest a dissatisfaction with Cohen. 
Implicit in Coopers & Lybrand 's rejection of the death knell doc-
trine is a finding that a litigant is not entitled to immediate review 
under Cohen simply because a court anticipates that a certain order 
may cause the litigant to abandon her action. This is particularly true 
when the determination of whether a claim will be abandoned is unre-
liable,57 arbitrary, 58 susceptible to manipulation, 59 or inefficient. 60 
However, this finding does not restrict Cohen since Cohen never held 
that the possibility of unreviewability, by itself, justified an interlocu-
tory appeal. 61 Rather, the collateral order doctrine has always re-
quired unreviewability coupled with a final order collateral to the 
main action. 
In addition, the Court in Coopers & Lybrand seems to have tight-
ened the requirements for finding unreviewability by concluding that 
an order denying class status is not effectively unreviewable after final 
judgment despite the fact that it may be the death knell of the action. 
However, the Court also held, without discussion, that such an order 
is neither conclusive nor separate from the merits of the plaintiff's 
cause of action. 62 In view of the Court's conclusion that the effect of 
460 U.S. at 11 n.11 (emphasis in original). 
57. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1978), the Court stated: "What 
effect the economic disincentives created by an interlocutory order may have on the fate of any 
litigation will depend on a variety of factors. Under the 'death knell' doctrine, nppealability turns 
on the court's perception of that impact in the individual case." 
58. In Coopers & Lybrand, the Court found the death knell rule administratively difficult 
because "[s]ome courts have determined their jurisdiction by simply comparing the class of the 
named plaintiffs with an arbitrarily selected jurisdictional amount." The Court added: "With• 
out a legislative prescription, an amount-in-controversy rule is necessarily an arbitrary measure 
of finality .•.. " 437 U.S. at 471-72 (footnote omitted). 
59. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 472-73 (1978) ("Moreover, ifthejurisdic• 
tional amount is to be measured by the aggregated claims of the named plaintiffs, appellate juris• 
diction may tum on the joinder decisions of counsel rather than the finality of the order.") 
(citation omitted). 
60. Referring to one method of administering the death knell doctrine, the Court said, "The 
potential waste of judicial resources is plain." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,473 
(1978). 
61. "[T)he inarticulate premise that Cohen embraces every order that cannot be later re• 
viewed on appeal is a false one." D'Ippolito v. American Oil Co., 401 F.2d 764, 765 (2d Cir. 
1968) (per curiam). 
62. 437 U.S. at 469. It is not clear from the Coopers & Lybrand opinion whether the Court 
viewed any one of these findings as more important than any other since it stated them, one after 
the other, with no discussion. One might argue that since the findings with regard to separability 
and finality are less controversial, the Court meant to base its holding on them and that the 
conclusoiy statement of the more controversial issue of effective reviewability was added as dic-
tum. In a similar case, a court refused to allow immediate review of an order refusing class status 
but based its holding on a lack of finality and separability only. In re Cessna Aircraft Distribu-
torship Antitrust Litig., 518 F.2d 213 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). 
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an order refusing to certify a class is uncertain, its holding with respect 
to reviewability may only reflect a hesitancy to permit courts of ap-
peals to speculate as to whether a given order is, as a practical matter, 
reviewable. 63 
Similarly, in Firestone, an order denying defendants' motion to dis-
qualify plaintiffs' counsel in a civil case was held not to fall within the 
collateral order exception because such an order could be effectively 
reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment. 64 The Court in Firestone 
did not tighten the "effectively unreviewable" test, but decided only 
that the "petitioner fail[ed] to supply a single concrete example" of 
irreparable harm that would result from deferred review. 65 
The appellant's position in Firestone differed significantly from that 
of the appellant in Cohen. In Cohen, if the lower court's decision that 
the plaintiff was not required to post security for costs could not be 
appealed pending final judgment, the appellant would have lost the 
right it sought to assert - the right to have security posted before 
permitting the plaintiff to proceed with the action. 66 Firestone, how-
ever, asserted a right only to avoid a prejudicial judgment that might 
arise out of a trial conducted by a particular attomey.67 That right 
would not be lost by postponing review because Firestone could still 
be given a new trial in which the asserted prejudice could be cured. 
Thus, unlike the appellant in Cohen, Firestone did not face the possi-
bility of losing the right asserted. Nevertheless, Firestone could have 
obtained immediate review had it been able to establish the possibility 
of losing "the legal and practical value" of the right asserted. 68 In the 
63. Again, because of the conclusory nature of the Court's finding, it is hard to discern what 
prompted the Court to state that an order refusing class status is reviewable only after final 
judgment. However, in discussing the death knell doctrine, the Court stated that "litigation will 
often survive an adverse class determination." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 470. The Court 
continued, "What effect the economic disincentives created by an interlocutory order may have 
on the fate of any litigation will depend on a variety of factors." 437 U.S. at 470 (footnote 
omitted). Thus, the Court may have concluded simply that an order refusing to certify a class is 
not clearly unreviewable upon final judgment. 
64. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). 
65. 449 U.S. at 376. 
66. Cf Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (right guaranteed by speech or debate 
clause would be mooted if criminal defendants could be questioned about legislative activities at 
trial); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (appellant's claim that he was about to be 
subjected to double jeopardy would have been mooted if the second trial were allowed to proceed 
to final judgment); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying motion to reduce bail would 
be moot if not reviewed before trial). 
67. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 370-71 ("Petitioner argued that respondent had a clear conflict of 
interest ... [that] would give him an incentive to structure plaintiffs' claims for relief in such a 
way as to enable the insurer to avoid any liability. This in tum, petitioner argued, could increase 
its own potential liability."). 
68. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 
(1978)). In referring to previous decisions upholding a right to immediate review, the Firestone 
Court said that "each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which could be 
destroyed ifit were not vindicated before trial." 449 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. Mac-
Donald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)). 
1558 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1547 
absence of such a finding, the Supreme Court refused to apply the col-
lateral order doctrine. 69 
Further, the Court's language in Firestone reflects no intent to 
limit the Cohen collateral order doctrine. Although the Court did not 
emphasize the tradition of giving section 129170 a practical rather than 
a technical interpretation, it did briefly reiterate that policy by quoting 
Cohen's statement on the matter. 71 In addition, the Court suggested 
that instead of extending the collateral order doctrine beyond the lim-
its set forth in Cohen, courts ought to rely more on the statutory ex-
ceptions to section 1291 to provide relief in appropriate cases. 
However, the Court did not propose that these statutory measures re-
place the collateral order doctrine in cases where the Cohen test is 
met.72 
In addition, although the Firestone Court stressed the narrowness 
of the collateral order exception 73 and the strictness of the effectively 
unreviewable standard, 74 it reaffirmed its position that the irreparable 
harm standard does not require that a right actually be lost if review is 
denied. 75 The Court reiterated that an order is effectively unreview-
able when it irreparably denies a right as a practical matter even 
though it might not technically deny the right itself. 76 It was Fire-
stone's failure even to show evidence of such a practical denial that 
doomed its chances for immediate appeal. Firestone left open the 
questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial grants of disqualifi-
cation motions in both criminal and civil cases and of pretrial denials 
of disqualification motions in criminal actions. 77 The Supreme Court 
has since resolved two of these issues by holding that a trial court's 
69. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 377. The Firestone Court did recognize, however, that there might 
be situations in which a party would be irreparably damaged if forced to wait until a final adjudi-
cation before securing review of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing counsel. 
However, the Court decided that it was not necessary "to resolve those situations, [by creating] a 
general rule permitting the appeal of all such orders." Instead, in those rare instances, "the 
moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification" or it may pursue statutory exceptions 
to the finality rule. 449 U.S. at 378-79 n.13. 
70. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1982). 
71. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 375 ("Cohen . .• continued a tradition of giving§ 1291 a 'practical 
rather than a technical construction.'") (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
546 (1949)). 
72. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 & n.13. 
73. 449 U.S. at 374. 
74. 449 U.S. at 376 (noting that in order to satisfy the effectively unreviewable standard, it 
must be the case that 'denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatso-
ever.'") (quoting United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)). 
75. 449 U.S. at 376 ("It is true that the finality requirement should 'be construed so as not to 
cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.' ") 
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976)). 
76. All previous collateral orders, the Court stated, have "involved an asserted right the legal 
and practical value of which could be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.'' Firestone, 
449 U.S. at 377 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)). 
77. 449 U.S. at 372 n.8. 
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pretrial decision to disqualify counsel in either a criminal (Flanagan v. 
United States)78 or a civil (Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller)79 case is 
not immediately appealable. 
Although Flanagan and Koller follow the path blazed by Coopers 
& Lybrand and Firestone, they do not undermine the validity of the 
collateral order exception. The Court found in both80 cases that if the 
right to be represented by counsel of one's choice were found to be 
improperly denied and to warrant reversal even without a showing of 
prejudice, the denial would not meet the third prong of the Coopers & 
Lybrand's test - the requirement that the order be "effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment."81 Alternatively, if the or-
der could be reversed only upon a showing of prejudice, it would fail 
to satisfy the second Coopers & Lybrand condition that the order be 
truly collateral. 82 Despite the results reached in these cases, the Court 
simply applied the Coopers & Lybrand test in reaching its decisions. 
No narrowing or undermining of the traditional collateral order doc-
trine occurred. 
Thus, although some courts of appeal have relied on Firestone and 
Flanagan83 as precedent for denying immediate review of orders re-
fusing to appoint counsel, 84 the Cohen doctrine itself has not been fun-
damentally altered. Accordingly, if an order denying appointment of 
counsel satisfies the Cohen test, it ought to be appealable as a collateral 
order. 
78. 465 U.S. 259 (1984). 
79. 105 s. Ct. 2757 (1985). 
80. These cases were decided on very similar grounds. While the Flanagan Court empha-
sized the particularly compelling need to avoid piecemeal criminal prosecutions due to the strong 
interest both the public and the accused have in prompt resolution of criminal cases, 104 S. Ct. at 
1054-55, any suggestions that the case's outcome turned upon its being a criminal rather than a 
civil dispute were resolved by Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2763 ("Although delay is anathema in crimi-
nal cases, it is also undesirable in civil disputes . . . ."). 
81. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2767 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (footnote omit-
ted); Flanagan, 104 S. Ct. at 1056 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468) (footnote 
omitted). 
82. Koller, 105 S. Ct. at 2764; Flanagan, 104 S. Ct. at 1056-57. 
83. The impact of Koller, decided June 17, 1985, is net yet known. 
84. Firestone led three courts of appeals to conclude that orders denying motions to appoint 
counsel were not immediately appealable. See Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 146 (1st Cir. 
1983) (per curiam); Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The Third 
Circuit later concluded, in Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984), that Flanagan 
effectively overturned its earlier decision, Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981), which 
had treated orders denying motions to appoint counsel as immediately appealable. The Sixth 
Circuit also vacated one of its earlier decisions in accordance with Flanagan. Henry v. City of 
Detroit Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985) (vacating 739 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
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II. THE COHEN TEST APPLIED TO DENIALS OF MOTIONS FOR 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
To be immediately appealable as a collateral order, an order deny-
ing a motion to appoint counsel must satisfy the tripartite test85 set 
forth in Cohen. 86 The Cohen test was formulated to advance the pur-
poses of the final judgment rule, which are to avoid inefficiency and 
injustice and to protect the independence of district court judges. 87 By 
bringing the collateral order doctrine into play only when these goals 
will be furthered, the Cohen test prevents courts from undermining the 
finality rule. This section applies the three-part test to orders denying 
appointment of counsel and concludes that each part of the test is 
satisfied. 
A. Conclusive Ruling 
The first requirement under the Cohen test is that the order be 
conclusive. To satisfy this requirement the order cannot be "inher-
ently tentative."88 Thus, an order such as a denial of class certifica-
85. See notes 39 & 52-55 supra and accompanying text. 
86. According to the Ninth Circuit, however, it is not altogether clear how courts should 
apply the Cohen test: 
While in this case we have examined each of the elements of the Cohen rule separately, and 
have found that each is satisfied, we do not mean to suggest that this type of analysis is the 
only proper method to be used in determining whether the collateral order exception applies 
in cases involving other types of orders. The three Cohen criteria are in some instances 
interrelated. In some cases one element may be of far greater significance to the outcome 
than the others. We have noted earlier that two of the three elements are not absolute in 
nature. The separability determination is at times a relative one - "too independent of the 
cause itself." The reviewability determination - effectively unreviewable - may require a 
similar kind of judgment. The same may in some instances be true with respect to the 
finality requirement. 
Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1314 n.35 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted). This reasoning suggests that courts will apply the Cohen test differently, de-
pending on subjective _perceptions of the nature and relative importance of each prong of the test. 
See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text. 
87. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. 
Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 2760-61 (1985); Flanagan v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051, 1054 (1984); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Cobbledick v. United States, 
309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). Cf. Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders - A 
Structural Reform Toward Redefinition, 1 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (1973) ("In fact, the 
threat of irreparable harm seems to be the overriding consideration that evokes this collateral 
order doctrine to find appealability within section 1291.") (footnote omitted); Comment, supra 
note 35, at 452 (''The final judgment rule can nevertheless lead to unjust results or inefficiencies 
in certain circumstances. Statutory and judicial exceptions have therefore been created to miti-
gate its effects."); Comment, Collateral Orders and Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions to the Fi-
nality Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 746, 757 (1957) ("Courts have recognized the frequent hardships 
which would attend an inflexible application of the final decision rule and have permitted it to be 
circumvented"). 
88. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n.11; Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 & n.14 (1983); see also 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
supra note 30, § 3911, at 470 ("First, the matter to be reviewed must have been finally disposed 
of by the district court, so that its decision is not 'tentative, informal or incomplete.' " (quoting 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949))). 
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tion, 89 which may be reconsidered by the district court, does not 
qualify for immediate review.90 However, the mere fact that a court 
has the power to change its ruling does not mean that its order can 
never be found to be conclusive.91 On the contrary, Cohen was only 
concerned with insuring that the order would not be "subject to recon-
sideration/ram time to time" by the trial court.92 In this sense, a rul-
ing is "inherently tentative" only when "some revision [by the lower 
court] might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of litiga-
tion."93 Under this standard, an order denying appointment of coun-
sel is final and therefore appealable.94 
B. Separability 
The circuit courts disagree on whether an order denying appoint-
ment of counsel embodies an issue sufficiently "separate from the 
merits of the action" to invoke the collateral order doctrine.95 The 
Supreme Court's language suggests that the separability test is a rela-
89. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(l) "provides that an order involving class status 
may be 'altered or amended before the decision on the merits.' " Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978). 
90. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring); Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 n.14 (9th Cir. 1981). 
91. 15 FEDERAL PRAcnCE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 470. 
92. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949) (emphasis added). 
93. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 13 n.14 (1983). 
94. See, e.g., Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. 
Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1981) (conclusiveness requirement satisfied 
where "the district court •.. in no way indicat[ed] that its order was tentative"); Spanos v. 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 808 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (denial of motion to 
appoint counsel found to be conclusive notwithstanding district court's expressed willingness to 
reconsider motion at later point in action). 
Cf. Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (acknowledging that 
the order denying the motion for appointment of counsel "arguably satisfies the first two prongs 
of the test"). But see Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985) 
("Orders denying appointment should be presumed tentative, however, because these motions 
are . . . frequently made with the filing of a pro se complaint and with little or no showing of any 
efforts to obtain counsel."); Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(order denying appointment of counsel not necessarily conclusive, but instead subject to revision 
by the district court). 
95. Several courts have suggested that a denial of a motion to appoint counsel is sufficiently 
collateral to qualify for immediate review, reasoning that the refusal to appoint an attorney is 
separable from the merits of the action. See Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588 
(8th Cir. 1984); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977); see also 
Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). But see Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 
24, 26 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that the order denying counsel in Ray "clearly met the finality 
and separability requirements," but concluding that Ray's holding was erroneous insofar as it 
found the order effectively unreviewable). 
However, Judge Wallace's dissent in Bradshaw maintains that "[t]o determine whether a 
district judge's decision on the appointment of counsel constitutes an abuse of discretion, we 
would have to become at least somewhat enmeshed in the merits." Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 
662 F.2d 1301, 1322 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also Smith-Bey, 741 F.2d at 24; 
Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
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tive one.96 In Cohen, the Court said the separability requirement is 
satisfied when an order is "too independent of the cause itself to re-
quire that appellate consideration be deferred."97 Coopers & Lybrand 
defined noncollateral issues as questions that are "enmeshed in the fac-
tual and legal issues" of or "intimately involved with the merits" of 
the plaintiff's case.98 The Supreme Court does not, therefore, demand 
that a collateral order be wholly unrelated to the ·main action.99 
Under the Supreme Court's language, an order denying a motion 
to appoint counsel qualifies as independent. In evaluating such a mo-
tion, a judge must look to the plaintiff's financial resources, her efforts 
to secure counsel, and the legitimacy of her cause of action. 100 Unde-
niably, an examination of the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claim will 
require some familiarity with the facts of that claim; however, it would 
not "enmesh" the court in those facts. It would require only an "inci-
96. See note 86 supra. 
97. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (emphasis added). 
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper suggest that the Cohen opinion itself sets forth two 
aspects of separability - the question of whether an appeal can be handled without reference to 
the merits of the main action and the question of whether the appealed ruling is something that 
will merge in the final judgment. 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 480. How-
ever, they also imply that these twin requirements are not fully reflected in more recent cases "in 
which the collateral nature of the order has been substantially ignored." Id. at n.32. They con-
clude that "[m]any cases satisfy both requirements. Other cases ignore one or both of these 
requirements, ordinarily because a threat of significant injury has seemed by itself sufficient rea-
son to allow immediate appeal." Id. at 480. 
In fact, recent cases sometimes address only the question of whether the appeal can be han-
dled without reference to the merits of the main action. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) ("In addition, we will assume ••. that the disqualification 
question 'resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action.' •• ,"); 
Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1307-10 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated with regard to orders granting motions to 
disqualify counsel in civil actions: 
[T]he extensive record now before us presents an entirely adequate basis for determining 
whether the district court's order was proper. That determination does not depend on subse-
quent events at trial, does not require us to "make any step toward final disposition of the 
merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment." 
Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737- F.2d 1038, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (emphasis added), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 
2757 (1985). 
In any event, one commentator has stated that the separability standard is met when "[t]he 
appealable ••• order ..•• is an action itself, a separate litigation." Underwood, Appeals in the 
Federal Practice from Collateral Orders, 36 VA. L. REV. 731, 738 (1950). 
98. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n.12 (1978) (quoting Mercantile 
Natl. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963) and 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, 
§ 3911, at 485 n.45). 
99. In Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized the relative nature of the requirement. See note 86 supra. Professors Wright, Miller, and 
Cooper have alluded to the same conclusion: "Despite these formal requirements, however, ex-
amination of the separate requirements shows that if a sufficiently impressive showing of poten-
tial injury can be be made, the requirement of separability can be tacitly ignored." 15 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 478. 
100. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981); Caston v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977); Significant Development, supra note 53, at 846 
n.9. 
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dental" and "indirect" reference to the substance of the cause of ac-
tion.101 In fact, resolution of such an appeal would require no more 
familiarity with the main claim than resolution of an appeal from an 
order denying permission to proceed in forma pauperis, which re-
quires a similar finding as to the legitimacy of the cause of action. 102 
The Supreme Court has already concluded that the denial of a motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis is immediately appealable, thereby recog-
nizing that such a superficial examination of a plaintiff's lawsuit is sep-
arable from the merits. 103 
Immediate appeal of orders denying motions to appoint counsel 
would simply not produce any of the harms that the separability re-
quirement is intended to prevent. One such harm is unwarranted in-
terference by appellate courts in the merits of the case - issues that 
are properly reserved to the district courts until completion of the ac-
tion.104 However, a judgment based on the pleadings regarding the 
legitimacy of the action will not seriously interfere with the trial 
court's much more thorough inquiry into the merits of the claim.105 A 
ruling by the appellate court regarding frivolousness would not control 
the trial court's findings on the merits because the ruling would not be 
directly tied to the merits. Nor would such a ruling create the possi-
bility of repetitive consideration of the merits by the court of appeals 
- another danger that the separability requirement is intended to pre-
vent.106 The very brief reference to the facts needed for a determina-
tion regarding frivolousness would not duplicate the much closer 
examination of the facts that would be necessary upon appeal from 
final judgment. 
101. Thus the order involves only incidental and usually indirect reference to the sub-
stance of the plaintiff's claim. It . . . does not, under any circumstances, require the court 
to become "enmeshed" in the issues involved in a determination of the merits. . . • 
Other orders that have been held appealable under the Cohen exception also require 
some reference to the merits. 
Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1981). 
102. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981) {"forma pauperis 
status requires two findings very similar to those required in this case: (1) a finding of indigency, 
and (2) a finding that the underlying claim has some merit.") (footnote omitted). 
103. See Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (per curiam). 
104. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1981). 
105. In Luna v. International Assn. of Machinists Local 36, 614 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 
1980), the court looked to the facts alleged by the plaintiff to guide its determination of whether 
the cause had merit. In addition, in title VII cases, the courts often rely on the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's issuance of a right-to-sue Jetter in determining whether a suit 
has merit. See Luna, 614 F.2d at 531; Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1319-20 
(9th Cir. 1981) (deferring to agency finding that there was "reasonable cause to believe that the 
plaintiff was the victim of discrimination" and finding no further inquiry into the merits of the 
claim necessary). 
106. See 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 470-71. 
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C. Availability of Effective Review After Trial 
The third and perhaps most important107 prong of the collateral 
order test has generated the most disagreement among the circuits in 
cases involving appeals from orders denying appointment of counsel. 
The appeals courts that have refused immediate review of such orders 
have generally relied on this prong for their decisions. 108 
There are several good reasons for concluding that orders denying 
appointment of counsel are only effectively reviewable before entry of 
a final judgement. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(l) 
confer on certain litigants the right to appointed counsel. 109 If that 
right is improperly denied, its "legal and practical value" may be per-
manently lost because the pro se litigant may make prejudicial errors 
during the first trial which would render a new trial, with or without 
the assistance of counsel, worthless. 110 Since the collateral order doc-
trine defines as effectively unreviewable decisions denying rights, "the 
107. The decision whether to allow immediate review in a particular case, based on the col-
lateral order doctrine, usually turns on this third prong. According to Professors Wright, Miller, 
and Cooper, it is not difficult to find cases which have ignored some of the other requirements. 
15 FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at 468. 
108. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam); Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
109. 28 U.S.C. § 191S(d) (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(f)(l) (1982) appear to leave ap-
pointment of counsel up to the discretion of the judge. However, if a pro se litigant seeks such 
counsel lllld meets the statutory criteria, presumably a judge must appoint counsel. If not, appeal 
from a refusal to appoint counsel would be worthless since the district court's decision could not 
be reversed. While the courts have not recognized a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, 
these statutes certainly reveal a congressional intent to confer on litigants who meet the relevant 
criteria a statutory right to counsel. See generally Poindexter v. FBI, 737 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (a title VII case). Some commentators have called for a constitutional right to counsel in 
civil cases. See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966); 
Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); cf. Slavin v. 
Curry, 690 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1982) (right to counsel exists in "exceedingly complex" cases 
under § 191S(d)). 
Some courts have suggested that the need for counsel is particularly acute in title VII 
cases: [T]he nature of Title VII actions more often than not pits parties of unequal strength 
and resources against each other. The complainant, who is usually a member of a disadvan-
taged class, is opposed by an employer who not infrequently is one of the nation's major 
producers, and who has at his disposal a vast array of resources and legal talent. 
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 2137, 2148; see also Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1183. At least two courts have considered 
Congress' special concern for title VII complainants in reasoning that an order denying appoint• 
ment of counsel in an employment discrimination case will, because of the complexity of the 
action, be effectively unreviewable. See Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 739 F.2d 
1109, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985); Bradshaw v. Zoological 
Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981). 
This Note assumes that there is no distinction between title VII and other actions for pur-
poses of considering whether an order denying counsel may be immediately appealed. See 
Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e cannot discern any 
sensible reason for basing the appealability determination on whether a civil rights plaintiff 
brought a Title VII suit as opposed to a § 1983 suit."). 
110. See, e.g., Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw 
v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 
664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting). 
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legal and practical value of which could be destroyed if. . not vindi-
cated before trial,"111 orders denying appointment of counsel should 
qualify as effectively unreviewable. 
The Court's refusal to accept this argument in Firestone was not an 
outright rejection of the point. Instead, the Court's decision reflected 
a determination that the "petitioner fail[ed] to supply a single concrete 
example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it wam[ed]."112 The 
petitioner's only assertion was that without immediate review, the re-
spondent might shape his clients' claims for relief in a way that irrepa-
rably increased petitioner's liability. 113 The Court found that this 
result would not constitute sufficient injury, 114 and that, in any case, 
petitioner did not establish conclusively that it was likely to occur in 
the absence of immediate appeal.115 
Similar considerations distinguish Flanagan and Koller. In both 
cases, the unavailability of interlocutory appeal did not leave any party 
without counsel at trial or on appeal. 116 In contrast, a litigant who 
could not appeal an order denying a motion to appoint counsel would 
be forced to proceed as her own attorney - a formidable undertaking 
that might cause the plaintiff to give up altogether or to make blunders 
that would render her claim untenable even if counsel were appointed 
following a successful appeal from a final judgment. 
Where a litigant is erroneously denied appointed counsel in a civil 
case, the limitations inherent in pro se litigation would irreparably 
jeopardize the right asserted in the absence of immediate review. 117 
111. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981) (quoting United 
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)). The Court in Firestone also stated tliat "the 
finality requirement should 'be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost 
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.'" Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376 (quoting Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976)). 
112. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981). In Firestone, the 
Court in fact admitted that there would be situations in which irreparable harm would result 
from a denial of immediate review. However, it expected such cases to be rare and thus thought 
alternative remedies could deal with them. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 n.13. Indeed, the availabil-
ity of alternative remedies arguably distinguishes Firestone from a case in which a plaintiff's 
motion to appoint counsel has been denied. A litigant whose motion to appoint counsel has been 
denied has no alternative remedy. See Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 
1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting). 
113. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376. 
114. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376 ("Our cases require much more before a ruling may be con-
sidered 'effectively unreviewable' absent immediate appeal.'') See also Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 
F.2d 843, 846 (3d Cir. 1969) (Pecuniary injury alone may not be sufficient to invoke review 
because "[e]very interlocutory order involves, to some degree, a potential loss.''). 
115. Firestone, 449 U.S. at 376. ("[P]etitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for 
meaningful review will perish unless immediate appeal is permitted.''). 
116. See Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dept., 739 F.2d 1109, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984), 
vacated, 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985). 
117. See, e.g., Poindexter v. FBI, 737 F.2d 1173, 1180, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984). "Courts have 
long recognized the problems of the pro se litigant.'' Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 
F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting). In addition, one commentator has 
stated, "Proceeding pro se, even in the presence of the most protective trial judge, the average 
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One study of federal pro se litigation has noted that "[t]he assistance 
of counsel is the most important prerequisite to obtaining fair review 
of federal claims . . . . There is simply no other way to assure [indi-
gent] litigants substantial justice .... " 118 Another has noted that 
"[t]he pro se litigants' record of success is so poor that they have been 
characterized as a 'society of losers.' " 119 
In addition, the courts, particularly in the criminal area, have re-
peatedly stressed that "[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to 
the very existence of a fair trial.'' 12° Finally, "[s]ubstantial differences 
have been found in the outcomes of the cases in which the defendant is 
unrepresented as compared with the cases in which he has counsel."121 
These observations are equally applicable in civil cases. The courts 
recognize a constitutional right to counsel in criminal but not in civil 
cases because the potential loss is typically greater in a criminal 
trial, 122 not because a criminal trial presents more complex issues. 123 
The difficulties confronting a pro se litigant threaten to injure ir-
reparably both the legal. and practical value of her asserted right to 
counsel unless an erroneous refusal to appoint counsel is immediately 
reviewable. The legal value is threatened not because the issue be-
comes immediately moot as in Cohen, but because an untrained pro se 
litigant may never make it to final judgment and subsequent appeal. A 
pro se litigant is unlikely to have the capacity to develop and follow an 
litigant may waive certain privileges, fail to assert some essential fact or issue, or even enter into 
an unconscionable settlement for lack of knowledge of his full rights under the law." Note, The 
Indigent's "Right" to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 1009 (1975), 
Other courts have discussed the difficulties encountered by pro se prisoners. See Hudson v. 
Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), affd. on rehearing, 424 F.2d 854 
(D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960); see generally Rob• 
bins & Herman, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 629 
(1976); Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the 
Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157 (1972); see also commentary cited at note 109 supra. 
Some of the criminal right-to-counsel cases discuss generally the handicaps inherent in pro se 
litigation. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-36 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Moreover, as one commentator has noted, "many of the underlying 
inequities suffered by the pro se litigant have remained hidden." Zeigler & Hermann, supra, at 
160. 
118. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 211 (footnote omitted). 
119. Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More Than a Pawn in the 
Game, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 769, 770 (1975) (quoting Kohn, 'Society of Losers' Finds a Win-
ner; Widow Wins Second Circuit Case, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7). 
120. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972). 
121. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 13 (1967), 
122. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("When the 
deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, denying the assistance of 
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due process.") 
(footnote omitted). 
123. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 
(1964) ("Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with 
practiced and carefully counseled adversaries."). 
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effective litigation strategy.124 As a result, she may become frustrated 
and abandon the claim before final judgment, forfeiting the legal value 
of the right to appointed counsel. 125 Similarly, a pro se litigant might 
fail on a technicality to secure an appeal. 126 
The practical value of the asserted right to appointed counsel is 
threatened because, although the litigant may actually obtain the right 
to appointed counsel following appeal, her errors in the first trial may 
have rendered the right meaningless. The pro se litigant might settle 
for an inadequate sum 127 or prevail at trial but recover less than she 
would have recovered with the assistance of counsel.128 An even 
more serious threat to the practical value of the right to appointed 
counsel is posed by the fact that the pro se litigant will be bound in a 
124. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). The typical prose 
litigant has been characterized as "indigent, formally untutored in the law and often unedu-
cated." Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 159 (footnotes omitted). Nor can a prose litigant 
rely on help from the judge to insure a fair trial. "Most pro se litigants . • • agree that a kindly 
attitude on the part of the court is no substitute for an attorney." Robbins & Herman, supra note 
117, at 678. "[T]he fact remains that limitations on the court's jurisdiction can preclude, at 
times, assistance or forgiveness." Id. at 677. 
125. See, e.g., Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw 
v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); Robbins & Herman, supra note 117, at 
677 ("[S]ome litigants, perplexed by the proceedings . . • or failing to recognize that the district 
court has erred, simply give up."); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 212 ("Allowing com-
plaint actions to remain open without assigning counsel is often very cruel, and results in distress, 
distrust, disgust and hatred for legal institutions."). If the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the 
case, no appeal would be available. See Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1052 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (1985). 
While the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay apparently abandoned the death 
knell doctrine as a basis for determining reviewability after final judgment, it is not entirely clear 
whether the Court abolished the doctrine altogether or only concluded that the mere fact that a 
litigant may abandon her claim is not, without more, sufficient to render an order effectively 
unreviewable. 437 U.S. 463,477 (1978). Unlike Coopers & Lybrand, even if the plaintiff who is 
erroneously denied counsel elects to pursue the claim, she is unlikely to be able to do so without 
causing irreparable damage to her cause of action. The situation is thus more aptly characterized 
as "death knell plus." 
126. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. Zoo-
logical Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, 
at 219-20. 
It is more difficult to secure an appeal after final judgment because under 28 U.S.C. § 2111 
(1982) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, a pro se litigant must not only show that the 
judge's order refusing counsel was erroneous, she must also show that it was prejudicial. This 
will increase her ultimate burden of proof, Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1313-14, since, if she were 
granted an immediate appeal, she would only need to show error. 
In addition, commentators who conducted an extensive study of pro se litigation in the Sec-
ond Circuit discovered that approximately 85% of all pro se appeals were terminated before or 
shortly after an appeal was noticed. Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 219. This is partly 
because of the complexity of the appeal procedures. Id. This study also revealed that in most of 
those cases which did survive the procedural phase of the appeal, relief was summarily denied. 
Id. at 242. 
127. Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., 
dissenting) (''Thus, the pro se litigant . . • may feel pressured to compromise his substantive 
rights by settling on terms less favorable than those he could have negotiated had he been 
represented"). 
128. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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second trial by "the inevitable prejudicial errors" she may have made 
at the first trial. 129 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, admissions 
by a party opponent are admissible into evidence.130 Thus, any state-
ment a pro se litigant might make in her first trial, either in pleadings, 
on the stand, or in depositions, could be introduced in the second trial. 
Moreover, the litigant's mistakes in the first action could taint the sec-
ond even if counsel prevented those mistakes from being repeated. As 
the Supreme Court has observed with respect to criminal cases: "[A] 
second trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prosecutor could 
make use of evidence which came out at the first trial when the ac-
cused was uncounseled. If the second trial were held before the same 
judge, he might no longer be open-minded."131 Thus the absence of 
an immediate appeal, assuming an erroneous ruling by the lower 
court, effectively denies the plaintiff the value of her right to pursue 
her claim with the assistance of counsel. 132 
Ill. THE POLICY SUPPORTING IMMEDIATE APPEAL FROM 
DENIALS OF MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
The courts created the collateral order doctrine to mitigate the 
hardship caused by technical insistence133 on the finality rule. 134 
Thus, the collateral order doctrine reflects a balance struck between 
the inefficiency of piecemeal litigation and the possible injustice of 
delay. 135 
129. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1981). According to 
the court in Bradshaw, the litigant could "be bound by or impeached with her earlier testimony, 
or suffer adverse consequences from uninformed and unwise stipulations." Bradshaw, 662 F.2d 
at 1312; see also text at note 121 supra. 
130. FED. R. Evrn. 801(d)(2). 
131. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 2S, S4 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). See generally 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 759-97 (E. Cleary ed. 3d ed. 1984). 
132. In Firestone, the Court relied on alternative remedies, such as protective orders limiting 
counsel's ability to disclose confidential information, to take care of cases in which a denial of 
immediate review actually would result in irreparable harm. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981). There does not appear to be an equivalent alternative 
remedy in cases in which a court has denied a motion to appoint counsel. 
133. This Note has attempted to apply the Cohen test formally and to argue that all three 
parts are separately met; however, courts and commentators have suggested that the test need 
not be so strictly applied. See note 86 supra. "It would be difficult to quarrel with a tendentious 
statement that the finality requirement should not be applied as a sterile formality, but should 
instead be applied pragmatically with an eye to fulfilling its underlying purposes." 15 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3913, at 522. If an order denying a motion to appoint counsel quali-
fies for review under the more formal application of the rule, it certainly ought to qualify under a 
more pragmatic standard - especially where review furthers the purposes of the collateral order 
doctrine. 
134. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. "Absent a sharp change in the course of 
events, the collateral order doctrine deserves to continue in substantially its present form, as a 
means of protection against irreparable injury in some of the many situations that do not fall 
within the narrow confines of the original hardship doctrine ofForgay v. Conrad." 15 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, supra note 30, § 3911, at S00 (footnote omitted). 
135. The determination of whether an order is immediately appealable "requires some evalu-
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will often promote efficiency. If the plaintiff is successful on interlocu-
tory appeal, not only will a new trial be avoided, but the remainder of 
the pending action will be conducted more efficiently.136 Conversely, 
if the litigant's interlocutory appeal is unsuccessful, the litigation may 
come to an end.137 The interests of judicial economy are therefore 
"best served by permitting such appeals."138 
Regardless of judicial efficiency, 139 immediate appeal is justified to 
prevent the hardship that delayed review would impose on any plain-
tiff denied appointed counsel.140 The collateral order doctrine re-
mains the principal means of avoiding the injustice that the finality 
rule sometimes produces.141 Delayed review of an order denying ap-
pointment of counsel could irreparably threaten the asserted right to 
the assistance of counsel. 142 This right is particularly well-recognized 
with respect to criminal defendants, 143 but also exists by congressional 
mandate for certain civil litigants.144 Congress' statutes reflect a long-
standing policy against pro se litigation.145 The strength of this policy 
is clearly reflected in Faretta v. California, 146 a criminal case in which 
ation of the competing considerations underlying all questions of finality - 'the inconvenience 
and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the 
other.'" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v. Petro-
leum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)) (footnote omitted). 
136. Litigation conducted by attorneys is "more orderly, rational, and reasonable.'' Brad-
shaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1309 n.20 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Zeigler & Hermann, 
supra note 117, at 202-05 (noting that pro se litigants tend to allow the litigation to stagnate at 
various stages). 
137. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A civil rights 
litigant, untrained in the law, may well decide that he is incapable of handling the trial and drop 
his claim ... .''); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 117, at 160 ("Most prose litigation never 
reaches the trial stage . . . .''). 
138. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981). 
139. The collateral order doctrine does not restrict immediate review to those cases in which 
application of the finality rule would be both inefficient and unjust. See Note, The Finality Rule 
for Supreme Court Review of State Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1004, 1010 (1978) (excep-
tions to finality "should be restricted either to circumstances so extraordinary and compelling 
that they cannot justifiably be sacrificed for the common good or to situations in which insistence 
on finality would be sheer formalism"). 
140. See Note, supra note 87, at 1045. 
141. See Note, supra note 34, at 351 ("Any judicial system that affords a right to appellate 
review must ensure that appeal does not come too late to be effective.''). This ensurance is the 
purpose of the collateral order doctrine. See id. at 364; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to 
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 89, 110 (1975). 
142. See Part IL C supra. 
143. See, e.g .• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806 (1975) (emphasizing that the right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is a "clear constitu-
tional rule" but holding that a state may not prevent a defendant from representing himself). 
144. See note 109 supra. 
145. See generally commentary cited in note 109 supra. 
146. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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the Supreme Court seriously considered denying a litigant the right 
voluntarily to appear pro se in a state court proceeding. 
Thus, a pro se litigant should have every opportunity to demon-
strate that she has a right to have counsel appointed by the court. 
Clearly, one of the justifications for this policy is the inability of most 
prose litigants to represent their own interests adequately. Thus, even 
if this policy does not quite compel a constitutional right to represen-
tation in civil cases, it at least justifies allowing pro se civil litigants the 
opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights to counsel before those 
rights are rendered meaningless. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized few instances in 
which denying immediate appeal of an interlocutory decision made 
later vindication of an individual's claims impossible, courts ought to 
recognize such an instance in the case of a litigant whose motion to 
appoint counsel is denied. Since such a litigant may well "already 
have lost the rights he seeks to preserve"147 by the time the court en-
ters a final judgment from which appeal may be taken, orders denying 
motions to appoint counsel are effectively unreviewable. These orders 
are also conclusive and collateral to the merits of the original action. 
Thus, under the collateral order doctrine, as developed in a long line 
of cases beginning with Cohen and ending for the moment with Koller, 
an order denying appointment of counsel qualifies for immediate re-
view. Immediate review is necessary if the collateral order doctrine is 
to further justice where technical insistence on finality does not. 
147. Bradshaw v. Zoological Socy., 662 F.2d 1301, 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wallace, J., 
dissenting). 
